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A social network service (SNS) is the most prospering business in Web 2.0 regime. In 
May 2007, Facebook implemented “Open API” which allows third-parties to create 
applications in SNSs. This innovation led to a rapid growth of Facebook and made 
surpass Myspace, the leading SNS at that time. Based on the laws of the network value, 
we hypothesize “Open API” policy revolutionized Facebook’s topology from one defined 
by Metcalfe’s law to that by Reed’s law. We model the duopoly competition of SNSs and 
show that the growth of SNS adoption is a polynomial function of time under both laws, 
but the marginal growth under Reed’s law is greater than that under Metcalfe’s law. We 
also empirically test the effect of “Open API” to user growth by using panel analysis on 
the traffic data of five SNSs. The result implies “Open API” makes a SNS turn into a 
group forming network. 
Keywords: Social networks, open innovation, online communities, network topologies, network 
value 
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Introduction 
From the inception of Web 2.0, the focus of internet use has shifted to social interactions in the internet 
and social network services (SNS) have become prevailing, especially online platforms enabling such 
interactions. Morgan Stanley reported that social networking usage surpassed that of e-mail since 
November 2010 (Morgan Stanley 2010). According to eBizMBA Rank1, the top 10 SNSs such as Facebook, 
Myspace, Twitter, and Linkedin each have millions of regular visitors each month. 
Myspace and Facebook are known as the pioneer examples that characterized features of Web 2.0, and are 
maintaining SNSs listed in the “Alexa Top 10 Global Sites2.” Both boast over tens of millions users 
nowadays. Myspace was launched in August 2003, and over 80 million users had subscribed to Myspace 
by 2007 (Ahn et. al. 2007). Facebook started its business about six months later, and had to catch up to 
Myspace. 
In 2007, Facebook announced an “Open API3” platform model and brought in a new trend to social 
networking services. Similar to the “open source software development” policy in the software industry, 
this new “Open API” platform allowed third-parties to create applications on the Facebook platform 
(Arrington 2007). Due to the impact of this open innovation, lots of APIs were created and used by 
individual users in Facebook. According to the recent statistics in “Facebook Press Room4,” over 550,000 
applications have been developed by this time, and users of Facebook installed 20 million of them every 
day. 
After this open innovation, there brought a huge changeover in competition between Facebook and 
Myspace. In October 2007, after 4 months following the innovation, the Alexa Traffic Rank5 of Facebook 
arose by almost 10 steps from 16th. In contrast to this, Myspace’s rank gradually fell off. Eventually, 
Myspace lost it No. 1 title to Facebook in 2009 (MSNMoney 2009). This reverse in ranking defies the 
open frequently cited law in network, the network externalities. According to the positive network 
externalities, the larger (leader) network has competitive advantage over the follower. This startling 
outcome of network growth in Facebook raises the question of how “Open API” innovation affects social 
network characteristics than in turn result in the growth of networks.  
One remarkable change after open innovation is that “Open API” affected user interactions in Facebook. 
For this issue, the media commented that adoption of “Open API” somehow seems to bring proliferation 
of new activities for users, who were previously limited to just making online connections (Stone 2008). 
Social network games were the most popular case of newly emerged activities which were available as 
APIs in Facebook.  Such new activities were usually based on group interactions, not just on peer-to-peer 
interactions. In case of “Farmville (http://www.farmville.com),” one of the most installed API in 
Facebook, a group of people can harvest crops together in the same virtual place. Due to the characteristic 
of openness, “Open API” brought a huge increase in the number of APIs in Facebook. The explosive 
growth in the number of APIs may change the fundamental rule of interaction in Facebook.  
Relating to the rule of interactions, there are three well-known statements of the network value – 
Sarnoff’s, Metcalfe’s, and Reed’s law. Each of them assumes different topology of the network (Dohler et. 
al. 2008; Westland 2010). For example, Sarnoff’s law assumes a one-to-many broadcasting network such 
as radio or traditional TV’s. Metcalfe’s law is applied to one-to-one communication networks, in which 
users interact by link-formations. On the other hand, in a network under Reed’s law, each new group that 
is formed contributes to the value. Therefore, we hypothesize that “Open API” may have changed the 
characteristics of networks, that is, network topology. The network topology is related to the logical and 
                                                             
1 http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites 
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physical structure of the network6. Interactions over a network can be view as logical structure of the 
network. Hence, a fundamental change in this logical structure (topology) may alters the mechanism of 
interactions, and values of networks are determined by the number of interactions that may be governed 
by newly introduced interaction mechanisms. Based on this context and the unexpected outgrowth of 
Facebook over then-leader Myspace, it is important to find out whether Facebook’s open innovation has 
really changed the fundamentals of its network topology and the rule of game. 
To address this question, the main objective of our research is to find the relationship between the growth 
of SNS adoption and the network topology which is linked to the value of a social network. Finding the 
relationship between the growth and topology of social network is important in an academic perspective. 
From Sarnoff’s to Reed’s law, so-called network laws are yet to be analytically or empirically verified 
(Metcalfe 1995; Reed 1999) while industry often cites them. As a result, verification of these network value 
functions and application to our analysis is one of the important issues of this study. Previous studies in 
social networks were mainly focused on the behavioral issues in social networks (Boyd & Ellision 2008). 
From the relationship between the network growth and its topology, our research also tries to analyze the 
effect of network value to the adoption of SNSs in a duopoly situation. The growth of social network is 
practically important indicator for social network business, because most of these services (SNSs) rely on 
advertising for their profits. After the announcement of “Open API”, Facebook experienced a radical 
increase of users, and erased its gap with Myspace. The analysis of the impact of “Open API” may suggest 
insights to newly entered SNS about how to take over the leading SNS. Competition of two technologies 
under the existence of network effect has been intensively studied in economics and MIS literature 
(Arthur 1989). However, to the best of our knowledge, they assume the constant and mostly homogeneous 
network topologies (Swann 2002). In this study, we focus on the changes of network topologies and their 
impact on SNS competition.  
For these ends, our research employs two approaches. First, we use well-known laws of the network value 
– Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law - and model the duopoly competition of dynamic social network adoption 
using a simulation method in multi-periods. Using daily web traffic data from Facebook and Myspace 
including the date Facebook adopted an “Open API” policy, we empirically test the difference of growth 
patterns between, before and after “Open API.”  We try to generalize our findings with data from 5 famous 
online social networking sites to perform panel data analysis on the effect of “Open API” to the growth of 
SNS. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review research on social network adoption 
and network value. In section 3, we suggest our model and simulation. The result of simulation is 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 is for the empirical analysis to enhance the result of the analytical model. 
Section 6 discusses the implication of our findings both from the analytical model and the empirical test. 
Finally, we discuss the managerial implications, future research directions, and contributions. 
Literature Review 
A social network has been widely studied in IS research, especially since the term “Web 2.0” emerged. 
Prior studies on social networks (or social network analysis) were usually centered on patterns of human 
interactions (Everett 1962; Milgram 1967; Granovetter 1973), structures of human relations (Laumann & 
Pappi 1976; Dunbar 1992), or development of tools to explain human behavior in the network (Wellman 
1988; Anderson & Jay 1985). However, these studies mostly focused on technical issues about social 
topics (Boissevain 1979). Research on social networking sites (SNSs) mainly discussed purposes of SNS 
uses (Boyd 2004; Marwick 2005), relationship with offline social networks (Ellison et al. 2006; Choi 
2006), and privacy concerns of SNS uses (Acquisti & Gross 2006). In a broad perspective, our research is 
also about human interactions in social networking sites, but we more focus on the economic impact 
according to the change in rules of human interaction.  
“Open API” in Facebook is somewhat similar concept with open innovation. Open innovation is a 
paradigm that firms use external ideas to advance their technology (Chesbrough 2003). Open innovation 
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have been usually adopted in the area of R&D department – the case of “Proctor & Gamble” (Chesbrough 
2006) – or software development like the case of “Linux” (Godfrey 2000). Our research aims that “Open 
API” brought enormous increase in diversity of user activities, and assumes that “Open API” changed the 
rule of interactions in Facebook. 
Relating to the rule of interactions in networks, the three network value law – Sarnoff’s, Metcalfe’s, and 
Reed’s law – assumed different underlying network structures and network externalities. Sarnoff’s law 
stated that the network value is proportional to the network size, which assumed that the network effect is 
constant. Metcalfe’s law states that the value of a network is proportional to the square of the network size 
(Metcalfe 1995). It is generally applied to a telecommunication network such as telephones. In a 
telecommunication network, the main interaction is one-to-one communication. Under Metcalfe’s law, 
the marginal network effect is equal to the network size. Reed’s law states that the value of a network is 
proportional to the exponential of the network size (Reed 1999). It is generally applied to “Group Forming 
Networks (GFNs).” In GFNs, people consider collaboration and group facilitation as an important value. 
News groups or chat groups in the internet are examples of GFNs. In a GFN, the number of possible 
subgroups determines the value of a network. These three laws are widely-accepted statements, but there 
is lack of theoretical and empirical validation about these laws so far. Adopting the network value laws, we 
develop the model of two SNSs competing user adoptions.  
Various studies examined the network effect and its implementation. The network effect rises when the 
value of a product to one user depends on how many other users exist. Technologies that are generally 
subjected to strong network effects tend to exhibit long lead times following by explosive growth with the 
result of positive feedbacks. Kats and Shapiro (1986) examined the technology adoption in the presence of 
network externalities. They argued that the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are 
sponsored and they suggested strategic advantages in a two firm competition situation. Saloner and 
Shepard (1995) econometrically tested the existence of the network effect through the empirical 
examination of adoption of automated teller machines. Farrell and Saloner (1986) examined the dynamics 
of installed base competition. Arthur(1989) also has emphasized the role of positive feedback in the 
economy. Network effects were more recently popularized by Robert Metcalfe. In our research, we mainly 
incorporate Arthur’s model of technology adoption to the analytical model. 
While prior studies argue the important role of interaction and group forming activity in SNS, their 
analyses are based on mostly static social network service in terms of network topology. In early studies, 
behavior of impression management (Skog 2005), the network structure of SNSs (Kumar et. al. 2010), 
and privacy issues (Acquisti & Gross 2006; George 2006) were examined. While Facebook’s phenomenal 
success has been frequently mentioned (even by a Hollywood movie, “The Social Network”), theoretical 
explanation has not been provided. Facebook was originally a follower in the SNS market and outpaced 
Myspace later. It is a unique case that defies the first move advantage from positive network externalities. 
This study is to fill such void. 
Model 
The main purpose of the model is to show growth patterns of social network adoption by different 
mechanisms of user interactions in a social network. For this issue, our study models two social network 
services that are in a competition with the purpose of adopting potential users. Our analysis basically 
employs a basic structure of Arthur’s (1989) model. Arthur’s model handled the adoption of two 
competing technologies under the pre-existence of the network effect that occurred by previous adoptions. 
Instead of technology, we consider “social network” to be an online social network site (SNS), such as 
Facebook or Myspace. We also regard the network effect in the model as the value which is induced by 
interactions among existing members of the network. The main difference between our model and 
previous studies is the functional form of the network value. We apply two different rules of interactions – 
Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law – and derive how growth patterns of SNSs change by different functional forms 
of the network value. 
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Social Network Services 
Our model assumes two different online social network services – A and B. In each period, users in each 
SNS make interactions with each other and the amount of interactions among users leads to an increase 
in the network value of each SNS. In our model, it is assumed that interactions in a SNS are sharing 
information with other users in that SNS. Finding out trends or getting information is one of the 
important reasons that people use social network services on the internet (Ellison et. al. 2006; Weaver & 
Morrison 2008; Shi et. al. 2010). Therefore, the network value of a SNS j at time t (NVjt) is assumed to be 
the total amount information which is created at time t in SNS j. The network value of a SNS is 
determined by the total number of existing users at the previous period, and the network value law (lawj) 
that decides the rules of interactions in SNS j. There are two types of network value laws, Metcalfe’s and 
Reed’s law. The main difference between these two laws is the unit of interaction. If a SNS follows 
Metcalfe’s law (lawj=M), the rule of interaction is based on one-to-one communication, which implies 
that the unit of interaction is a node / a user in the network. On the other hand, if SNS j follows Reed’s law 
(lawj=R), users interact by group communication. This implies the unit of interaction under Reed’s law is 
a group. We will describe the details of how users interact with each other in the other section. 
Potential Users 
There are N potential users in the model. At every turn, potential users observe expected utilities of 
adopting each SNS and choose the one that provides the most benefit to the user. Similar with the Arthur 
(1989), the model assumes a preferred SNS for each user (fi=A or B). This implies that each user is 
initially given one SNS that he prefers over the other one. Therefore, if the expected utilities of adopting A 
and B are the same, a user chooses to adopt the preferred one. User i’s expected utility of adopting SNS j 
at time t is as follows  
1ijt ij jt
U wtp NVα −= +  (1) 
 
Uijt consists of user i’s willingness to pay for adopting SNS j (wtpij) and the network value of j at time (t-1) 
(NVjt-1). wtpij means each user i’s perceptive value to SNS j. For the preferred SNS, user i’s willingness to 
pay for adoption (
iif
wtp ) is normally distributed with mean of μ 7 variance of σ 2. For the non-preferred 
one, willingness to pay for adoption is ( ∆−
iif
wtp ). Our model does not assume switching cost of SNS 
adoption.  
Rules of Interactions in a Social Network 
Generally, social networks are considered as either a one-to-one communication network or a group 
forming network (Reed 2001). A social network usually contains various functions such as instant 
messaging or online chatting. To identify the topology of a social network, it is important to focus on what 
kinds of functions the network has. In that sense, our analysis assumed a typical social network that 
focuses on functions that facilitates one-to-one communication such as messaging. Our analysis also 
considers that each application (API) in a social network can be a trigger for making subgroups in the 
network. In that sense, we only focus on the rules under Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law. The rule under 
Sarnoff’s law is not considered because Sarnoff’s law assumed the network effect is constant regardless of 
the network size. 
 
                                                             
7 μ  generally gets negative value, which means that most people are reluctant to adopt a new product or 
technology (Lee and Lee 2006) 
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Figure 1. Rules of Interactions and the network value of a SNS 
 
Under Metcalfe’ law, users make interactions by sending information to other users. Sending information 
under Metcalfe’s law includes interactions such as writing comments on other users’ Myspace profile 
pages or posting on walls in Facebook. At every period, each user of SNS j can send information to other 
users up to pj times. Hence, if the number of users in SNS j at time t is njt, the network value NVjt is njtpj. 
Metcalfe’s law states that the network value is proportional to square of the network size, but this holds 
only when all links in the network are activated. Prior studies criticized over-estimation of network value 
under Metcalfe’s law (Odlyzko and Tilly 2005; Yoshikai 2005; Briscoe et. al. 2006). Considering the cost 
of sending information8, our model complies with the method of interactions under Metcalfe’s law but 
limits the amount of interaction per user to pj. The number of interactions in SNS j (pj) is assumed to be 
equivalent to all users in the same SNS. Users spend all possible number of interactions, because they 
have to maximize their benefit. 
Under Reed’s law, on the other hand, users interact by group communication. In a SNS following Reed’s 
law (lawj=R), each user joins several groups in the SNS and send information to the affiliated group. A 
group in our model is like an API in Facebook. In Facebook, people play games with other users through 
API. Considering active uses of APIs and cost of API uses9, our model limits that the total number of 
groups in a SNS is same as the number of existing users. Moreover, we assumed that a user in SNS j can 
join qj number of groups at one period. If a SNS follow Reed’s law, each user in the SNS creates an API 
when he/she adopts the SNS. GA in Figure 1 represents the group created by user A. Before the joining 
process occurs, each group has only one member. After joining groups, each user stocks information to 
the groups he/she belongs to. A user can send one unit of information to each group. The value of each 
group in a SNS is defined as the multiplication of the size of group and the amount of information in the 
group. The network value of SNS under Reed’s law is the sum of total value of groups in the SNS. Figure 1 
shows the graphical representation of interactions in a SNS by its network value law. 
The Procedure of Simulation 
Based on the set up for SNSs, potential users, and the rules of interactions, we perform a simulation to 
derive the growth patterns of SNS adoption in a duopoly competition. The procedure of simulation 
organizes with three major parts. In the initialization part, the network value law is assigned to SNS A and 
                                                             
8 Generally, it is impossible to interact millions of Facebook users at a given time.  
9 In fact, Facebook has over millions of API, but only tens of them occupy the most interaction (active uses 
of API). 
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B, and wtpij and fi are assigned to potential users. After the initialization, the model iterates adoption and 
interaction procedures. The iteration performs 50 times but stops when there is no more new adoption 
(including switch to the other SNS) in this period. In the adoption process, each potential user observes 
the network values of SNS A and B at the previous period and chooses one that gives the most benefit. In 
the interactions process, adopted users make interaction with others in each SNS. The amount of 
interaction affects the network value of a SNS. 
Results and Discussion 
For the simulation, several variables in the model are set by certain values. The number of potential 
adopters in the market is set by 1000 (N=1000). wtpij is assumed to follow normal distribution with mean 
value -50 and a variance of 30 ( 250, 30µ σ= − = ). The gap of willingness to pay for adoption between a 
preferred and a non-preferred SNS is 55 ( 55∆ = ). Under Metcalfe’s law, the default value of the amount 
of interaction per user is 5 ( 5' == jj pp ). Under Reed’s law, the number of groups that a user can join at 
one period is also set to 5 ( 5' == jj qq ). As mentioned in section 3, these values are assigned in the 
initialization process. Adoption and interaction processes are iterated until 50 periods or until no more 
new adoptions occur. The results are obtained by 1000 times of simulation. In this section, we mainly 
discuss the growth patterns of SNS adoption and marginal growth under Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law. 
Growth Patterns of SNS Adoption 
The growth patterns of SNS adoption under Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law can be mathematically derived to 
an approximate functional form.  Assuming two firms are symmetric10, user i will adopt SNS j at time t 
only if wtpij is lower than -NVjt-1. This implies that SNS j’s number of users at time t (
j
tn 1− ) is affected by 
the standard normal cumulative distribution function of wtpij. Therefore, it can be expected that the 








− −Φ . Therefore, by Taylor approximation of the normal cumulative 
distribution function (Marsaglia 2004), it can be speculated that the growth of SNS adoption is an odd 
degree polynomial function of time t with a given number of initial adopters ( jn0 ). We empirically test the 
relationship between the number of adopters and time using the data of the simulation11. Assuming two 
SNSs are symmetric, the result verifies that the growth of SNS adoption takes the form of an odd degree 
polynomial function of time t (Under Metcalfe’s law β1=11.88, β2:-0.003, all ps<0.01; Under Reed’s law 
β1=29.01, β2:-0.027, all ps<0.01). 
 
Proposition 1. If the number of interactions per user is far lower than the network size, the growth of 
SNS adoption under both Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law is approximately an odd polynomial function of 
time with a given number of initial adopters. 
 
Figure 2 shows the growth patterns of SNS adoption under Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law. Both growth 
patterns can be explained with three parts – the number of adopters in the equilibrium, the critical mass 
that converts marginal growth into an increasing trend, and the time that it takes to reach the equilibrium. 
It can be observed that the number of adopters in the equilibrium under Reed’s law is higher than the one 
                                                             
10 This means that A and B follow the same network value law with the same number of initial adopters 
and interactions per user. 
11 Considering the rest terms as an error, we set up the model to 3
1 2
j
t tn C t tβ β ε= + + +  for regression 
analysis. 
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under Metcalfe’s law, and the equilibrium also reaches faster. This shows that the network value per unit 
of interaction under Reed’s law is greater than the one under Metcalfe’s law.  
 
 
Figure 2. Growth of SNS adoption under Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law 
The Marginal Growth of SNS 
There are three main factors affecting the marginal growth of SNS adoption – the initial adopters ( jn0 ), 
the number of interactions per user (pj, qj), and the mechanism of interaction (Metcalfe’s or Reed’s law). 
The number of initial adopters means whether the SNS has a first-mover advantage. The number of 
interactions per user refers to the question of how many interactions are activated in the SNS. The 
mechanism of interaction determines if the SNS is facilitated to one-to-one communications or group 
communications. Generally, these three factors affect the amount of interaction and eventually increase 
the growth of SNS adoption.  
In perspective of the marginal growth, the number of interactions per user has more effect on the growth 
of SNS adoption than the initial adopters. In the model, we perform simulations by altering SNS A’s 
number of interactions per user or the number of initial adopters. Regardless of the network value law, it 
can be shown that adoption of SNS A grows more rapidly as pA increases, even when B’s initial adopters 
are higher than A’s. This implies that the first-mover advantage can be overcome by facilitating 
interactions in a SNS, which leads to increase in the marginal network value. 
 
Proposition 2. Under both Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law, the marginal growth to the number of 
interactions per user is higher than that of the initial adopters if other conditions are hold. 
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Figure 3. Growth of SNS adoption under Metcalfe’s and Reed’s law (the variables except pA and pB get the 
same values as those that were set up in the beginning of Section 4) 
 
The result shows that the most effective factor that increases the marginal growth of SNS adoption is a 
change in the mechanism of interaction – from one-to-one communication to group communication. The 
change of interaction mechanism, from one-to-one to group communications, transforms the network 
value per unit of interactions. Even when A has higher initial adopters and higher number of interactions 
per users, the SNS adoption under Reed’s law outgrows that under Metcalfe’s law. This means that the 
change of interaction mechanism in a SNS is the most effective way to increase the number of its adoption. 
 
Proposition 3. The effect of the network value induced by group communications dominates that of 
one-to-one communications in perspective of marginal growth of SNS adoption. 
 
The Impact of Open Innovation to the Growth of SNS 
Considering that Facebook adopted open innovation in 2007, we put the similar circumstance in our 
model. This is to analyze the impact of open innovation to the growth of SNS adoption in the model. We 
regard SNS A and B as Myspace and Facebook respectively, and bring the real case of “Open API” in 
Facebook to our model. For the simulation, it is assumed that SNS A has more initial adopters (150 initial 
adopters) to let A take first-mover advantage – just like Myspace took in the real case. Both A and B are 
assumed to follow Metcalfe’s law at the start of the simulation, but B changes to follow Reed’s law after 
the 10th period. Assuming that “Open API” triggered group interactions in Facebook, this change in the 
simulation eventually shows how open innovation affect the growth of SNS adoption. Figure 4 shows the 
result. As mentioned in the propositions, the change of interaction mechanism dramatically increases the 
network value of SNS B. The number of adopters of B eventually overgrows that of A after 14th period. This 
result seems consistent with the case of “Open API” in Facebook. 
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Figure 4. The change of interaction mechanism (from Metcalfe’s to Reed’s law) in SNS B 
(α A=0.03, α B=0.002) 
 
Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we empirically validate our finding in the simulation model. The main finding of our 
model shows that the number of SNS adoption show different growth patterns in accordance with the 
network value law. In case of Facebook, it can be said that “Open API” triggered group interactions and 
changed the network value. For this issue, we first empirically test the effect of “Open API” policy to the 
competition between Myspace and Facebook. We use traffic data of Facebook and Myspace to verify 
whether the “Open API” policy increased group interactions in Facebook and the marginal growth of its 
users. After that, we also test the effect of “Open API” policy on the growth of social networking services. 
We collect the traffic data of 5 famous online social networking sites (SNSs) including Facebook and 
Myspace to verify the effect of group interactions to the value of the social network.  
For the empirical analysis, we collect the traffic data from “Alexa Web Information Services 
(http://aws.amazon.com/awis).” It provides two types of traffic data – Reach and Pageviews. Reach 
measures the number of users out of million samples. Reach data usually represent the percentage of all 
internet users who visit a given site. Pageviews measures how many times page was viewed by site visitors. 
In our analysis, we collected both types of daily traffic data over a period of November 11th 2006 to 
October 31st 2007 (365 daily samples). For the second test associating with 5 online SNSs, we collect the 
monthly traffic data from August 2007 to December 2010 (41 monthly samples).   
The Competition between Myspace and Facebook 
In this section, we first construct the regression model to test the relationship between the amount of 
interaction in a SNS and its adoption. Based on the model, we perform the Chow breakpoint test (Chow 
1960) on data that lies between the period of before and after “Open API." This test is for verification of a 
structural change in the relationship between the network value and the new adoption after introducing 
“Open API.”  
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Figure 5. Reach and Pageviews data of Facebook and Myspace (2006.11.01 ~ 2007.10.31; “Open API” 
announcement: 2007.05.24) 
 
According to the definitions of traffic data in prior studies, we use Reach data as a proxy for the number of 
users (adoption), and Pageviews data as the amount of interaction in a SNS. The reason using Reach 
instead of the direct measurement – the number of users – is because the statistics published by SNSs 
themselves usually include the data of fake or inactive accounts12. Therefore, using Reach data reflects the 
active number of users in a SNS, more than the total number of users. Additionally, Reach data is used to 
measure the market share in e-business (Kozberg 2001). Actually, the number of users of Facebook and 
Myspace (self-published data) increased 125% and 19% respectively during the period of our data sample13. 
The Reach data of Facebook and Myspace show similar trends of growth in the number of users. 
Pageviews data is a measurement of how many times a particular web property has been seen (Demers 
and Lev 2001). Therefore, it can be interpreted that Pageviews data is the amount of interactions that 
occur in a SNS. 
Regression models for the empirical analysis are based on the growth patterns in the results of the 
simulations. We hypothesize that the amount of interactions at a previous period positively affects the 
new adoption in a SNS. In the regression model, we use Reach data (Rf,t) as a dependent variable and 
Pageviews (PVj,t) as an independent variable as shown in equation (2). We observe whether there are 
changes in β i before and after “Open API (2007.05.24).” However, we discover that all Reach and 
Pageviews data have unit roots. For that reason, Durbin-Watson statistics is a value of 2.018 when using 
equation (2). Moreover, there are high correlations between Reach and Pageviews data in both Facebook 
and Myspace. Instead of applying equation (2), we use I(1) series of each variable and use equation (3). 
Because daily data was used in this case, the day of the week effect must be considered (Trusov et. al. 
2009). Therefore, Monday, Saturday, and Sunday are used as control variables. 
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Descriptive statistics show that both Reach and Pageviews increase twice as much after “Open API.” In 
case of Myspace, on the other hand, the data shows s slight decrease in Reach data, but in Pageviews the 
amount of interaction drops by almost half after “Open API.”  
 
Table 1. The data before and after “Open API (2007.05.24)” 
SNS Pageviews  ∆%  Reach  ∆%  Obs 
Before “Open API”  22431  1.22 41932  0.58 204 
Myspace 
After “Open API”  25110  -0.63 50901  1.22 161 
Before “Open API”  4865 4.50 9882  3.86 204 
Facebook 
After “Open API”  13736 3.98 31136  5.13 161 
 
F-statistics of the Chow breakpoint test between before and after “Open API” is 2.88, which rejects the 
assumption that no structural change exists after “Open API.” The result confirms that there are 
significant effects of interaction in the previous period to new adoptions in both Facebook and Myspace. 
In Facebook, it can be observed that there are positive effects on Monday and Sunday, but negative effects 
on Saturday. Out of seven days of the week, we only use Monday, Saturday and Sunday, which show 
significance in the model, as control variables. In fact, in April 2008, Facebook overtook Myspace in terms 
of web traffic which was recorded by Alexa Web Information Service. This result implies that the 
implementation of “Open API” changes the effect of user interactions to the growth of Facebook adoption. 
 
Table 2. The result of regression from 2006.11.01 to 2007.10.31 (breakpoint: 2007.05.24)
14
 
Myspace  Facebook  
variable  
before  after  before  after  
∆Rf,t-1  - - -0.390***  -0.136  
∆Rm,t-1 -0.297***  -0.214**  - - 
∆PVf,t-1 -0.055  -0.081  -0.009 0.036* 
∆PVf,t-13 0.002  0.006  -0.004  0.006*  
∆PVm,t-1 -0.009  -0.211***  -0.220*** -0.001  
∆PVm,t-13 0.007**  0.011***  0.012***  0.009***  
Monday  0.636  -2.087**  5.287***  6.426***  
Saturday  -1.081  -0.274  -3.225***  -6.486***  
Sunday  0.569  1.197  2.894***  3.673***  
                                                             
14 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Adjusted R2 0.154  0.383  0.317  0.463  
 
The effect of “Open API” to the network growth 
The first test shows that there were a significant structural change in the network growth of Facebook and 
Myspace after “Open API” policy.  In this section, we use the traffic data of 5 famous online SNSs to 
generalize our results in the simulation. After Facebook announced “Open API” policy, many online SNSs 
tried to innovate their mechanisms of interactions. Out of the top 15 most popular SNSs based on 
eBizMBA15, we select five sites which implemented “Open API” policy. Theses SNSs usually maintain over 
tens of millions of unique visitors. We collect monthly traffic data of these five sites, from August 2007 to 
December 2010.  
 
Table 3. The Profiles of SNSs
16
 
SNS Adopting “Open API” Launched Users  
Alexa 
Ranking 
Facebook 2007.05.24 2004 640,000,000+ 2 
Myspace 2008.02.05 2003 100,000,000+ 46 
Friendster 2008.08.19 2002 90,000,000 979 
Ning 2008.10.10 2005 42,000,000 128 
hi5 2008.03.31 2003 80,000,000 265 
 
In this test, we first verify the relationship between the growth of SNS adoption and its network value (the 
amount of interactions). For this issue, we use equation (4) for the panel data analysis. Like in the first 
test, the traffic data of the five SNSs show unit roots. Therefore we apply the difference of each variable in 
the equation. Openi,t is a dummy variable for classifying whether SNS i adopts “Open API” policy at time t 
(Openi,t =1). Therefore the coefficient γ 1 and γ 2 show the effect of “Open API” to the growth of SNS. 
Variable Sit is the market share of SNS i at time t. The results of simulation show that the effect of “Open 
API” cannot be activated without the sufficient number of users who can initiate group communications. 
the coefficient γ 3 and γ 4 implies the effect of interaction in other SNSs to the growth. 
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Table 4. The result of regression (2007.08 ~ 2010.12, 205 obs) 
variable  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
β1 -290.77 * 604.276 * 
Ri,t-1  0.033 *** 0.011 * 
                                                             
15 http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites 
16 These statistics are based on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_social_networking_websites 
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∆PVi,t-1 0.268 * 2.310 * 
∆PVi,t-13 -9.67 E-09 -4.19 E-07 ** 
Openi,t· ∆PVi,t-1  0.594 1.378 * 
Openi,t· ∆PVi,t-13 3.01 E-08 4.25 E-07 *** 
(1-Si,t)· ∆PVi,t-1 1.173 -1.257 * 
(1-Si,t)· ∆PVi,t-13 -1.01 E-07  1.86 E-08 
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.687 
 
In the pooled regression, most variables are not significant except for the relationship between the change 
in Pageviews and Reach (β2: 0.033). In the fixed effect model (the right column in Table 4), most variables 
show significances. Estimates of coefficient γ 1 and γ 2 are positive, which imply that adoption of “Open 
API” increases marginal growth of SNS adoption. The negative value in the estimate of coefficient γ 3 
implies that lower market share decreases the effect of “Open API” on network value. This empirical result 
tells that implementation of “Open API” policy generally encourages users’ group interactions and 
benefits the growth of SNS adoption. However, this innovation comes into effect when the SNS have a 
sufficient number of users than other competitors. Actually, after Facebook announces “Open API” policy, 
several SNSs tried to implement open platforms in 2008. However, due to the relatively small number of 
users (Table 3), other SNSs could not overtake Facebook which adopted “Open API” almost a year earlier 
than other competitors. In spite of this gap between Facebook and other SNSs in term of the number of 
users, every SNS showed slightly increase in the traffic amount after adopting “Open API.” This is 
consistent with the result of panel analysis – the positive effect of “Open API” to the SNS adoption. 
Implication 
Our model investigates the growth patterns of SNS adoption according to laws of network value. If a user 
cannot make all interactions possible in the SNS, which implies the number of interactions per user is 
limited, the growth of SNS is an approximate odd polynomial function of time t with a given number of 
initial adopters of SNS. This usually shows an S-shaped curve. The model characterizes three factors 
which affect the network value law. These three factors are: a number of initial adopters, which is 
associated to the first-mover advantage; a number of interactions per user, and the network value law that 
is determined by the mechanism of interactions in a SNS. The result in the model shows that the change 
in the network value law from Metcalfe’s to Reed’s law increases marginal growth and gives a chance for 
the follower SNS to overtake the leader.  
Applying the result of our model to the case of Facebook, it can be said that the “Open API” platform may 
have altered the mechanism of interactions from one-to-one messaging to group communication. At the 
beginning of its service, Facebook had a lower number of adopters than Myspace. This means that the gap 
of the number of adopters between Facebook and Myspace hindered the growth of Facebook. Moreover, 
users in Facebook did not interacted sufficiently enough with others users to overcome Myspace’s first-
mover advantage. “Open API” can be considered as a signal when user interactions in Facebook were 
transformed from one-to-one communications to group interactions. This change means two important 
things. First, as shown in the model, a unit of interaction creates more network value in group 
communication than one-to-one communication. Second, as mentioned in the Morgan Stanley Research 
(Morgan Stanley 2010), the method of interaction shifts from one-way (asynchronous) to multi-way 
(synchronous), which is one of the important features of Web 2.0 (Mannes 2006). These two 
characteristics attracted more interactions in Facebook than before. Facebook eventually overtook 
Myspace and took the leading position in the market. According to “Alexa.com,” Facebook was ranked in 
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the 2nd place, and Myspace ranked in the 18th place in the amount of web site traffic in 201017. By letting 
users freely create and use APIs in the social network, each API can play a role of a subgroup in Facebook. 
In API statistics in Facebook, six out of top ten APIs are social network gaming such as “FarmVille 
(www.facebook.com/FarmVille)” or “Mafia Wars (www.facebook.com/MafiaWars),” which let massive 
number of users interact with each other in one environment18. 
The empirical analysis applies the result of the simulation model to the real data. The analysis verifies that 
Facebook had a structural change after “Open API” in terms of the network value and growth of adoption. 
This can be seen as evidence that Facebook started to activate group formation after “Open API.” In the 
beginning of SNSs, people usually utilized them for self-representation and self-broadcast in the network 
(Boyd 2004). As the number of user increases, the network value shifted to one-to-one communications 
such as instant messaging. Nowadays, APIs become a kind of catalyst that increases subgroups in the 
social network nowadays. In conclusion, our study provides a theoretical explanation to the currently 
prevailing success of social networks. In addition, this may also be applied to explain disruptions in 
technology market that abruptly erase the leader’s advantage created by positive network effects.  
Conclusion 
This paper investigated the growth of social network services adoption using the functional form of 
network value. We apply the generally accepted laws of the network value and derive the model of 
competition between two SNSs. The results derived by simulation show that social network adoption is a 
polynomial function of previous adoption, and a SNS under Reed’s law gets higher marginal growth of 
adoption than the one under Metcalfe’s law. We may apply this result to other networks or standard 
competition. As mentioned above, often the winner-takes-all phenomena in IT are attributed to network 
externalities or network effects but disruptions have been observed in those markets as well. Such 
disruptions may be caused by fundamental changes in network characteristics. Our approach may be used 
to model such more general disruptions.  
The result of empirical analysis confirms that there exist significant structural changes in both Facebook 
and Myspace. Based on the regression of two types of traffic data, Reach and Pageviews, Facebook showed 
a rapid growth of traffic data after implementation of the “Open API” policy. On the other hand, the web 
traffic of Myspace showed a decreasing trend. By applying the analytical model to the empirical analysis, 
we can conclude that “Open API” drives the change in the method of interaction in the social network, 
which facilitates group formation in the network. This implies the significance of open/peer innovations. 
Eventually, it can be said that “Open API” activates a transformation of the ways of interaction in the 
social network. APIs let users to create subgroups in the social network, and increase the network value. 
For Facebook, which was the follower at that time, it was important to accelerate group formation 
functions and to increase the network value more rapidly.   
Several limitations of our research exist in both the simulation model and empirical analysis. We derive 
the growth patterns of SNS adoption by performing simulations under various assumptions for simplicity 
of analysis. In empirical analysis, we use traffic data as proxies for the network adoption due to limitations 
of data access. Nowadays, most of SNSs let users develop APIs in the social networks (Warren 2007). 
Detailed data of API statistics such as the number of API adoptions should lead the analysis of what kinds 
of APIs attract users more.  
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